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Abstract This paper is an attempt to understand the
impact of public R&D and public infrastructure on the
performance of the U.S. agricultural sector during the last
part of the twentieth century. A neoclassical Solow growth
model is not sufficient for this understanding given the
sustained growth performance of the sector. We base our
analysis on a well-known endogenous growth model, the
‘AK model’ where non-convexities are introduced through
non-rival inputs. Based on these models and within the
dynamic models that rationalize private and public decision
making, we have identified three testable hypotheses
regarding the aggregate agricultural production technology.
They are: (1) increasing returns to scale over all inputs; (2)
positive effect of additional units of public inputs on the
long-run demand for private capital; and (3) negative
impact of public inputs on cost. They are tested using two
estimation procedures on two data sets for U.S. agriculture.
One, covering the period 1948–1994, developed by USDA,
the other, covering the period 1926–1990, from Thirtle
et al. Maximum likelihood estimates do not conform to the
regularity and behavioral properties of the economic model
rendering them unusable for testing these hypotheses.
Bayesian estimates, although not totally satisfactory, do not
reject the hypotheses after prior imposition of some of the
regularity conditions. This supports the notion of an
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important role for public inputs on the rapid and sustained
growth of the sector. We calculate that, on average, one
additional dollar spent on public R&D stock reduces private cost by $6.5, implying a return on these public
expenses of 190%.
Keywords Non-rival inputs  Endogenous growth 
‘AK’ models  Dynamics  Returns to public inputs 
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1 Introduction
Neoclassical models of growth (Solow, Ramsey) have been
widely criticized because they cannot explain productivity
changes. According to these models, growth is exogenously given by an unexplained rate of technical change.
As a response, endogenous growth theories prove that
continuous growth is possible if there are non-rival inputs
in production (i.e., inputs that can be used by many firms at
the same time or by the same firm repeatedly without
additional cost). In these models, two necessary conditions
for endogenous growth are: increasing returns to scale over
all inputs, and positive impacts of non-rival inputs on the
returns to investment. The main contribution of this study
is to extend AK models of endogenous growth by incorporating public and private behavior in a dynamic context
to understand the evolution of productivity growth in the
U.S. agricultural sector. Estimable functions that allow
testing the necessary conditions for endogenous growth are
obtained.
Many other papers have focused on the effects of public
goods on private production, and most of them have found

123

J Prod Anal

positive impacts.1 For example, Aschauer’s (1989) pioneering work estimates a single production function for
the U.S. economy including public infrastructure as a
factor of production. Lynde and Richmond (1992) and
Berndt and Hansson (1992) have also used duality theory
to estimate the role of infrastructure in private production
in the U.S. and Sweden, respectively. Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) estimate the impacts of public capital and
research and development (R&D) on the cost structure of
12 U.S. manufacturing industries, and Morrison and
Schwartz (1996) study the regional effects of public
infrastructure on the U.S. manufacturing sector. Both of
the latter papers adopt a dual approach and find, in
general, positive effects of public inputs on manufacturing productivity. The last paper also finds increasing
returns to scale over all inputs (including infrastructure),
but it does not include R&D.
For the agricultural sector, papers like Antle (1983) and
Craig et al. (1997) find positive effects of public infrastructure and research on agricultural productivity but their
approach is based on estimating a single production function. Binswanger et al. (1993) estimates the impacts of
infrastructure and R&D in India. They consider, in a static
framework, that public infrastructure investments are
regionally allocated toward areas that are more productive.
Huffman et al. (2002) estimates the impact of R&D and
public infrastructure for five Midwestern states using a
static cost function approach. They estimate a large and
negative impact of these variables on cost. In contrast, the
present study presents a dynamic model of producer and
government behavior used within the context of a simple
endogenous growth model. This approach, based on duality
theory, maintains private and public rationality and allows
examination of the impacts of public inputs on producers’
and government behavior.
The model is tested with data for the U.S. agricultural
sector. United States agricultural productivity has increased
at an annual average rate of 2% over the 1948–1994 period.
Some authors have found that productivity growth has been
the main factor contributing to economic growth of the
agricultural sector (Ball et al. 1997). Additionally, the
provision of public goods in the form of public research,
extension, and infrastructure has been sizable in this
country. In an atomistic environment, these public expenditures are traditionally justified because of their low
degree of appropriability and high initial costs.
We ask if permanent changes in government policies
have generated permanent changes in growth rates of the
sector. Here, theoretically consistent dynamic firm-level
1
Exceptions are Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992) and Holtz-Eakin
(1994). They find insignificant effects of public infrastructure on
private production.
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demands for inputs that include the stocks of public
infrastructure and R&D are estimated for U.S. agriculture.
The existence of economies of scale and the likely positive
impact of public inputs on the steady state stocks of private
capital are tested. From the assumption of rationality in
government behavior, the optimal provision of public
goods is examined. The relationship between the public
objective of a benevolent social planner and that of the
private firms allows derivation of an important condition
that we test: that public inputs should reduce the private
costs of production.
There are several other reasons to undertake this study
that go beyond the understanding of the persistently high
rate of growth of productivity in U.S. agriculture. First, the
possibility of endogenous growth in the agricultural sector
may imply spillovers to other sectors and, in particular,
may have important effects on the growth of regional
economies based on agricultural activities. Second, Ball
et al. (1997) show the increasing use of materials and the
decreasing use of labor in the U.S. agricultural sector. By
determining the substitution or complementarity between
public and private inputs, one may explain the findings by
Ball et al. with respect to this evolution of quantities
demanded of private factors. Third, we hope to add evidence to the academic debate over the virtues of
endogenous growth theories over more traditional approaches to understand growth. It will also point towards a
powerful role of public policies in this process. Finally, the
estimation of shadow prices for public capital and R&D
stocks may provide an indicator to policy makers of the
optimal provision of public investment.
This paper is based on Onofri and Fulginiti (2003) and
develops as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of the
endogenous growth theory involving publicly provided
goods and the related testable hypotheses. Section 3
introduces a dynamic model in which both the behavior of
producers’ and government are rationalized. The testable
hypotheses are then revisited. Section 4 introduces the
empirical model and Sect. 5 presents the results. Finally,
conclusions are stated in Sect. 6.

2 Growth theory and testable hypotheses
In the neoclassical models of growth (Solow, Ramsey), the
rate of growth of per capita output is a decreasing function
of the per capita stock of private capital. Without technical
change and with a well-behaved neoclassical production
function, the level of per capita output converges to a
steady state where the growth of per capita private capital
eventually stops. This result, implied by the assumption of
decreasing returns to capital, has been one of the major
criticisms to these models.
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As a response to these empirically unsustainable
results, endogenous growth theory arose proposing different hypotheses. Some of these theories incorporate into
the models the reasons for technical change to occur
based on the presence of externalities that originate nonconvexities.
Non-convexities play an important role in new theories of growth. They are generally due to the presence of
non-rival goods. Following Romer (1990), non-rivalry
can be interpreted in two ways. First, non-rival factors of
production are valuable ‘‘inputs that can be used simultaneously in more than one activity.’’ Under this
definition, public goods, like public infrastructure for
instance, are non-rival inputs that can be used by many
producers at the same time. Alternatively, one can define
a non-rival input as that input that can be used repeatedly in the same activity. With this definition, a new
chemical process, for example, is an input that can be
used more than once in the production of a certain
product. In this case, non-convexities are intrinsically
associated to this input: there is a high cost of producing
the first unit, but the cost of producing subsequent units
is zero. In any case, since the presence of non-rival
inputs generates non-convexities, the production function
can be characterized by increasing returns to scale: F(kR,
kN) [ F(kR, N) = kF(R, N), with k [ 0, where R and N
stand for rival input and non-rival inputs, respectively.
Thus, if rival and non-rival inputs are doubled (k = 2),
output is more than doubled.
One of the pioneer studies in the endogenous growth
literature has been that by Romer (1986). In this paper,
Romer specifies a production function F(ki ; K; xi Þ; with ki
and xi being firm-specific inputs (x can be seen as a
vector of inputs) and K an input external to the firm, like
‘‘the level of knowledge’’ defined as a function of the
‘‘firm-specific knowledge’’ ðK ¼ gðRki ÞÞ: If F is increasing in K and linearly homogeneous in ki and xi ; a
perfectly competitive equilibrium is still possible, but the
factor ki no longer exhibits diminishing returns. Consequently, permanent endogenous growth of output per
capita is allowed.
Barro (1990) has developed a similar model where K
can be interpreted as the stock of public capital (hereafter
G). The intuition is that publicly provided capital (like
roads, sewer capital, etc.) has a positive impact on private
production affecting the productivity of the firm-specific
inputs. Public capital is assumed a public input that can
be used by additional producers without cost. Consequently, total stocks of public goods enter into the
production function of each individual firm. In this context, two necessary conditions for the hypothesized
endogenous growth are: existence of increasing returns to
scale over all inputs, and existence of constant returns to

scale over factors that can be accumulated. This second
condition implies that private capital is continuously
accumulated and there is an optimal ratio between private
to public capital. A weaker requirement, alternative to this
condition, would be a positive impact of G on the demand
for capital. Although not ensuring continuous growth, the
presence of this non-rival input would imply a positive
government contribution to growth.
The conditions mentioned above (i.e., increasing
returns to scale over all inputs and positive impact of
public inputs on private capital accumulation) can be
rationalized using the theory of the firm. The following
section introduces a model in which firms respond to
changes in public inputs provided by a benevolent social
planner. Estimable functions that allow testing for the
hypothesized endogenous growth conditions are then
obtained in a model that maintains private and public
rationality.

3 The model
A dynamic dual model of the firm is used to explain growth
based on the existence of public inputs. As was hypothesized, public goods might have positive effects on firms’
production. If the dual problem of the firms is considered,
public inputs might reduce cost of production given the
level of firms’ output. In this manner, increases of public
inputs would increase firms’ productivity.
The model assumes that economic agents are intertemporal optimizers: firms minimize intertemporal costs of
production and the government (social planner) maximizes
intertemporal welfare. Instantaneous adjustment of inputs
is not possible because of the existence of costs of
adjustment.
In their optimizing behavior, firms take public inputs as
given. Public inputs are considered fixed inputs of production in that they cannot be adjusted by the firm to
obtain the minimum possible cost. However, the government, behaving as a social planner, observes the
producers’ surplus and provides public goods to maximize
this surplus, subject to the cost of providing the public
inputs.
The model adopted in this paper assumes that the government knows the payoff function of the firms. This
assumption implies that the government knows how the
firms react when public inputs are changed, i.e. the government behaves as a ‘leader’ and optimizes first. Then,
firms take the level of public inputs as given and choose
private inputs such that their costs of production are
minimized.
The following figure shows the dynamics of behavior of
this economy.
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variable input whose price (w) is normalized to one.2 Thus,
the elements of p are relative rental prices.
Define now J(Z, y, p; G) as the value function that solves
problem (1). Assuming that C(y, Z, I; G) satisfies the set of
regularity conditions (A.1)–(A.6) and J(Z, y, p; G) satisfies
properties (B1)–(B5) (see Appendix 1), duality between
C(y, Z, I; G) and J(Z, y, p; G) can be established.
Duality between C(y, Z, I; G) and J(Z, y, p; G):3 any J(Z,
y, p; G.) satisfying conditions (B) is the value function
corresponding to C(y, Z, I; G) that satisfies conditions (A)
and is defined by

AvC

*

ACS(G0,K0 )

ACS(G0)
*

ACS(G1,K1 )

ACS(G1)

E0
E’0
E1
ACL

y

C(y, Z, I; G) ¼ Max½qJ(Z, y, p; G)  p0 Z
G represents the stock of the public input. K is the stock of
private capital. Three average cost curves (faced by the
firms) are shown in the graph. ACS(Gt, Kt) represents a
very short-run average cost curve when private inputs
(capital in this case) and public inputs are fixed. ACS(Gt) is
the short-run average cost curve when only public inputs
are fixed. Finally, ACL is the long-run average cost curve
when all inputs are adjusted.
At each period t, the firms observe the public input stock
G and choose the optimal path of investment (I) that allows
them to reach the optimal steady state (SS) stock K*.
Starting at E0 and with a stock of public inputs G0, firms
choose an optimal path of I that allows the firm to reach K0
at the minimum cost. The firm moves from E0 to E00 : The
path is adjusted the next period when the stock G1 implies a
new SS stock K1 : The firm then moves to E1. The two
conditions for the hypothesized endogenous growth of the
firms can then be seen in the graph:
Increasing returns to scale over the long-run average
cost curve (ACL): negative slope of ACL.
II. Positive effects of G on the SS stocks of the private
capital (i.e. the private input ‘‘that can be accumulated’’): the SS stock of K increases from K0 to K1
when G grows from G0 to G1.

p

 J0z (Z, y, p; G)(I  dZÞ

ð2Þ

or
q J(Z, y, p; G) ¼ Min½C(y, Z, I; GÞ þ p0 Z
I

þ J0z ðZ, y, p; G)(I  d ZÞ

ð3Þ

These two equations provide the relationship between the
cost function C(y, Z, I; G) and the value function J(Z, y, p;
G). They allow obtaining the properties of C(y, Z, I; G) in
terms of the parameters of J(Z, y, p; G) when firms minimize intertemporal costs. Thus, the derivative properties
that characterize C(y, Z, I; G) can be recovered from the
parameters of J(Z, y, p; G).4 Assuming rationality of the
private decision making process provides guidance, in the
form of a series of conditions, that need be satisfied by the
empirics. In addition the two previously mentioned growth
conditions can be tested through estimation of parameters
of J(Z, y, p; G).

I.

3.1 Conditions for endogenous growth
(1)

(a)

More formally, firms solve the following problem:
Z 1
Min
eqt ½C(y, Z, I; GÞ þ p0 Z]dt

IðtÞ [ 0

Z_ ¼ I  d Z

ð1Þ

which is the shadow price of G when the firms
are out of the SS. At the SS, the shadow price is

Zð0Þ ¼ Z0
Z(t) [ 0

8t

where C(y, Z, I; G) is the variable cost function; y is the
only output; Z is the vector of stocks of quasi-fixed inputs;
p is the rental price vector corresponding to Z; I is the
vector of gross changes in quasi-fixed inputs; d is the
diagonal matrix containing the depreciation rates of Z; G is
the vector of public inputs; and q [ 0 is the firm’s real rate
of discount. It is assumed that there is one perfectly
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The cost function: this is provided by the fifth
derivative property explained in Appendix 1.
The following expression represents this effect:
CG ðy, Z, I; GÞ ¼ qJG ðZ, y, p; GÞ
 JZG ðZ, y, p; GÞZ_  ðZ, y, p; GÞ

0

subject to

The impact of G on

CG ðy, Z, I; GÞ ¼ qJG ðZ, y, p; GÞ
If this expression is negative, the shadow price
of G is positive, meaning that public inputs
reduce cost of production.
2

Given w = 1, the variable cost function is C(1, y, Z, I; G). For
simplification, C(1, y, Z, I; G) = C(y, Z, I; G) is used.
3
Epstein (1983).
4
See Appendix 1 for the derivative properties.
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(b)

The dynamic demand for private capital: it can
be shown that the dynamic demand for the
quasi-fixed inputs Z can be expressed as
Z_  ðZ, y, p; GÞ ¼ M(p, G)[Z  Zðp, GÞ

ð4Þ

where Zðp; GÞ is the SS stock of Z and M(p, G)
is a stable adjustment matrix. This expression
yields a flexible accelerator adjustment path for
the stocks Z and is the reason for these dynamic
models to be called ‘‘multivariate flexible
accelerator models’’ (Epstein 1983). The form
of M(p, G) is determined by the functional form
of C(y, Z, I); however, only under certain conditions, it can be successfully expressed as an
explicit function of the parameters of C(y, Z,
I).5 The effect of G on the dynamic demand for
Z can then be decomposed into the effect on the
adjustment matrix and the effect on the SS stock
of Z. The condition for endogenous growth
would be for G to increase the SS stock of
private capital K (one of the quasi-fixed factors
of the firms). The effect on the adjustment
matrix is an effect on the speed of adjustment
toward the SS. It is still required for this
adjustment to be stable.
(2)

5

Scale Effects: there must be increasing returns to
scale over all factors of production (public and private
factors). Increasing returns to scale can be evaluated
by considering the elasticity of cost with respect to
output ðeCY Þ: It is well known in the production
economics literature that the elasticity of cost with
respect to output is the dual expression of the
elasticity of scale ðgy Þ : ecy ¼ 1=gy :6 When the elasticity of cost with respect to output is less than one,
firms exhibit economies of scale. However, in the
presence of factors external to the firm, some
adjustments should be made in order to obtain ecy :
Morrison and Schwartz (1996) show how to adjust the
elasticity of cost with respect to output when there are
quasi-fixed inputs in a static cost minimization
framework.7 This approach is used here for the case
of intertemporal optimization.8

See Epstein (1983) for details.
See Chambers (1988) for details.
7
The approach is based on Le Chatelier principle. Taking the
derivative with respect to Y on both sides of thePidentity
A
oG
CA ðP; Pg; YÞ  CðP; GðP; Pg; Y),Y) gives oC
¼ oC þ G ooC
oY PoY
G oY
A
Finally, completing elasticities gives eCY ¼ eCY þ G eCG eGY :
8
Stefanou (1989) extends the concept of scale elasticity to a dynamic
framework when the firm is not necessarily in steady state. He does
not include external factors.
6

Define the shadow price of the public input PG = PG
(Z, y, p; G). This shadow price can be interpreted as
an ‘‘inverse demand’’ for the public input. Solving for
G, given PG, gives the direct shadow demand for G
that can be substituted into (2) to get
CA ðy; Z; I; GðPG ; Z; y; pÞÞ ¼
Max½qJðZ; y; p; GðPG ; Z; y; pÞÞ  p0 Z
p

ð5Þ

 Jz0 ðZ; y; p; GðPG ; Z; y; pÞÞðI  dZÞ
Taking the derivative with respect to y, we obtain the
adjusted effect of output on cost when the ‘shadow
demand’ for G also changes with firms’ output:
oCA
¼ qJy  J0zy Z_  þ ðqJ0G  Z_ 0 JzG ÞGy (PG ; Z, y, pÞ
oy
ð6aÞ
At the SS, this expression becomes
oCA
¼ qJy þ qJ0G Gy ðPG ; Z, y, pÞ
oy
¼ Cy þ C0G Gy ðPG ; Z, y, pÞ

ð6bÞ

Completing elasticities gives the following equation
X
eA
eCG eGY
ð7Þ
CY ¼ eCY þ
G

which is the elasticity of cost with respect to output
adjusted for the presence of public inputs. Note that
eCG is the elasticity of cost with respect to external
factors, and eGY is the elasticity of ‘‘demand for
external factors’’ with respect to output. This demand
elasticity should be interpreted as a long-run one
representing the change in external factors necessary
to maintain the firm on the envelope long-run average cost curve after a change in output. Therefore, if
eA
CY is less than one, then there are increasing returns
to scale over all inputs.
3.2 Government behavior
As already mentioned, the government behaves as a
benevolent social planner. It provides public inputs to
maximize welfare (producers’ and consumers’ surpluses
less the cost of providing public inputs). A small open
economy is assumed, so the output price is given.
Assuming that public inputs do not affect utility of
consumers, the problem of the government is reduced to
the maximization of producers’ surplus. Then, in a
dynamic model, the government solves the following
problem
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Z

1

Min

Ig [ 0

eht ½J(y, Z, p; GÞ þ r0 G þ AC(Ig Þdt

0

subject to

G_ ¼ Ig  dg G

ð8Þ

Gð0Þ ¼ G0
G(t) [ 0 8 t
where J(y, Z, p; G) is the value function of the firms that
comes from their intertemporal cost minimization problem;
Ig is the investment in public inputs with stocks given by
vector G; AC(Ig) is the government’s adjustment cost of G;
dg is the diagonal matrix containing the depreciation rates
of G; r is the rental price of G; and h is the government’s
rate of discount. The existence of adjustment costs is justified by the multiple activities the government does with
given resources. Increasing Ig means that the government
must reallocate funds and resources used in the provision
of some other public goods, like goods that provide utility
to consumers or are inputs for producers in other sectors.
This reallocation of resources implies that some resources
are wasted in the process. This loss can then be modeled as
an adjustment cost.9
Define Jg(p, Z, y; r, G) as the government’s value
function that solves (8). Assuming that J(Z, y, p;
G) + AC(Ig) satisfies conditions (C.1)–(C.6) and Jg(p, Z, y;
r, G) satisfies conditions (D.1)–(D.5) (see Appendix 2),
duality between J(Z, y, p; G) + AC(Ig) and Jg(p, Z, y; r, G)
can be established.
Duality between J(Z, y, p; G) + AC(Ig) and Jg(p, Z, y; r,
G): any Jg(p, Z, y; r, G) satisfying conditions (D) is the
value function corresponding to J(Z,y, p; G) + (ACIg) that
satisfies conditions (C) and is defined by
J(Z, y, p; G) þ AC(Ig Þ ¼ Max½h Jg ðZ, y, p, r, GÞ  r0 G
r

 Jg0
G ðZ, y, p, r, G)(Ig  dg GÞ
ð9Þ
or
hJ

g

characterize J(Z, y, p; G) can be recovered from the
parameters of Jg(p, Z, y; r, G).10 It is one of these properties
(D2 (ii)) that we use as a basis to expect and maintain the
negative impact of public inputs on costs.

4 Empirical implementation
This section presents the empirical implementation of the
model introduced above. Ideally, having data on r, the
optimal path of Ig could be estimated. Nevertheless, the
contribution of public capital and public R&D to U.S.
agricultural growth and the conditions for the hypothesized
endogenous growth can still be tested through estimation of
the firms’ demands for private inputs. Adopting a flexible
functional form for the value function of the firms, all
parameters of interest can be recovered from the estimation
of the dynamic demands for private quasi-fixed inputs and
the demand for the variable input.
The model presented above is tested using two data sets.
The first data set covers the period 1948–1994 and in large
part consists of the one developed by USDA based on the
recommendations for consistent measurement and aggregation of the AAEA task force on statistics. Variables
needed for estimation include quantity indexes of capital
(K), labor (L), materials (M), and output (Y); implicit
prices of the three inputs; and stocks of public inputs
(public capital (G) and R&D (R)).11 K is an aggregate
measure of capital and land. Capital and labor are assumed
quasi-fixed inputs, while materials are the only variable
input.12 Output is an index of all crops and livestock
products. Public capital stocks are values of federal, state,
and local structures. Public R&D stocks are constructed
from R&D spending using Chavas and Cox’s method
(1992).13 We will refer to this as Ball’s data set.
The second data set, from Thirtle et al., covers the period
1926–1990 and is provided to the authors with the purpose of

ðZ, y, p, r, GÞ ¼ Min½J(Z, y, p; GÞ þ r0 G þ ACðIg Þ
Ig

þ Jg0
G ðZ, y, p, r, G)(Ig  dg GÞ

10

ð10Þ
These two expressions provide the relationship between
J(Z, y, p; G), the value function of the firms, and Jg(p, Z, y;
r, G), the value function of the government. They allow
expressing the parameters of J(Z, y, p; G) in terms of the
parameters of Jg(p, Z, y; r, G) and vice versa, when the
government maximizes intertemporal welfare by minimizing producers’ cost. Thus, the derivative properties that
9

Note that assuming the objective functions of consumers and
producers are separable with respect to the objective function of
problem (8), the government can decide the optimal provision of
different public goods separately.
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See Appendix 2 for these derivative properties.
See Ball et al. (1997) for details on all agricultural data. Public
capital stocks are from Survey of Current Business and include
buildings, highways, streets, sewer structures etc. Military structures
are excluded. Public R&D spending is from Alston and Pardey
(1996).
12
The adoption of materials as a variable factor in agricultural
production is consistent with the findings of previous studies, for
example, Vasavada and Chambers (1986), Luh and Stefanou (1991,
1993).
13
With this method, the stock for a given year is constructed as a
weighted sum of the last 30 years of expenditures, in which the
weights follow an inverted ‘V’ pattern. Huffman and Evenson’s
(1989) methodology, which consists of a trapezoidal pattern of
35 years of expenditures, was also tried. Results show no significant
differences.
11
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comparative examination14 with results to be presented at the
IX European Efficiency and Productivity Analysis Workshop
to meet in Brussels in June 2005.15,16 The same aggregate
variables are included. Output is an aggregate of all crops and
livestock products. K is an aggregate of capital and land.
Public R&D stocks are constructed from the R&D spending
provided by Thirtle et al. using the same method as in the
previous data set. As this data set does not have an aggregate
for materials, the fertilizer index is used along with the
expenditures on materials for 1967 from Ball’s to obtain the
variable input series. Public infrastructure has been added to
this data set and it is the same variable, extended, as described
above. We will refer to Thirtle et al. as the TST data set.
Consider the following normalized quadratic value
function:17
2 3
h
i P
JðP; Z; QÞ ¼ a0 þ A0P A0Z A0Q 4 Z 5
Q
2
32 3
1
P
B
B
BPQ
PP
PZ
1 0 0 0 4 1
þ ½P Z Q  BPZ BZZ BZQ 5 4 Z 5
2
Q
BQP BQZ BQQ
ð11Þ
This is a second order Taylor series expansion of J in (P, Z,
Q), where Z is the vector of quasi-fixed factors, P is the
corresponding vector of normalized rental prices, and Q is
the vector of output and public inputs; Ai is a 1 9 7 vector
of first order parameters and Bij is a 7 9 7 matrix of
parameters; a0 is a scalar parameter. Then, the vectors P0 ,
Z0 , and Q0 are equal to
0

P ¼ ½PK PL ;
14

0

Z ¼ ½K L;

where PK and PL are the prices of capital and labor,
respectively, normalized by the price of materials.
The dynamic demands for quasi-fixed inputs are then18,19

Z_ ðP; Z; QÞ ¼ J1
pz ðP; Z; QÞ½qJp ðP; Z; QÞ  Z

ð12aÞ

and the demand for the variable input (X*) is calculated
from
X ðP; Z; QÞ ¼ q½JðP; Z; QÞ  J0p ðP; Z; QÞP  ½J0z ðP; Z; QÞ

 p0 JPZ Z_
ð13aÞ
In terms of the postulated value function, (12a) and
(13a) become

Z_ ¼ qH þ ðqu  BPZ ÞZ þ qBPZ BPP P þ qNQ

ð12bÞ

1
1
X ¼ q½a0  P0 BPP P þ A0Z Z þ A0Q Q þ Z0 BZZ Z þ Z0 BZQ Q
2
2
1 0
0
0
0
þ Q BQQ Q  ½AZ þ Z BZZ þ Q0 BZQ _Z 
2
ð13bÞ
where H ¼ BPZ AP ; N ¼ BPZ BPQ ; and u is a 2 9 2 identity
matrix. Note that Eq. 12b constitute the flexible accelerator with
constant adjustment coefficients and can be rewritten as in Eq. 4

Z_ ðZ; P; QÞ ¼ M½Z  ZðP; QÞ

ð4bÞ

where
M ¼ ðqu  BPZ Þ
Z ¼ ðqu  BPZ Þ1 q½H þ BPZ BPP P þ NQ

0

Q ¼ ½G R Y;

This data set was also offered for modeling purposes to Professor
Quirino Paris and Professors Rolf Färe, Shawna Grosskopf and
Dimitris Margaritis.
15
See Thirtle et al. (2002) for details on the data set. Public capital
stocks have been added to this data set and are the same as in Ball’s
data set. Quantities were obtained by multiplying the indexes by the
expenditures for 1967 obtained from Ball’s data set. Prices are
implicit. The materials variable was obtained by multiplying the
expenditures from Ball for 1967 by the fertilizer index from TSM.
Drs. Kerstens and Stefanou provided a data series which is presented
in the Appendix of this issue that includes 1910–1990 but due to lack
of information on infrastructure before 1925 plus the need to
construct a stock of R&D capital reduced the length of the data set we
worked with.
16
Detailed data description and diagnostics, along with parameter
estimates and yearly estimates of the different concepts and their
standard errors, included in the original version of this paper can be
found at Onofri and Fulginiti (2005), http://agecon.unl.edu/fulginiti/
Productivity%20Studies%20and%20Data.htm
17
Other studies that have used second-order expansions to approximate the value function in the agricultural sector include Vasavada
and Chambers (1982, 1986), Vasavada and Ball (1988), Howard and
Shumway (1988, 1989), Taylor and Morrison (1985), Luh and
Stefanou (1991, 1993, 1996), Fousekis and Stefanou (1996), Lansink
and Stefanou (1997).

Z being the steady state values of private quasi-fixed inputs.
The model until now has been described in terms of
continuous time. For estimation purposes, however, a discrete approximation to Z_ must be used. Z1 being the lag
of Z, (12b) can be expressed as
Z ¼ qH þ ðu þ qu  BPZ ÞZ1 þ qBPZ BPP P þ qNQ
ð12cÞ
Joint estimation of (12c) and (13b) gives all the parameters
needed for testing the effects of public inputs on firms’
costs, steady state stocks of capital, and scale.20,21
18

To clarify notation, subscripts in the value function J denote
gradient vectors. B and A are matrices of parameters.
19
See Appendix 1 for derivation.
20
This estimation assumes that farmers expect the current input
prices to prevail in the future. In this way, optimization plans are
revised each period when new information is obtained (i.e., when
farmers observe the new prices).
21
Note that the theory presented here is a theory of the firm.
Nevertheless, the data used for estimation is highly aggregated.
Consistent
linear aggregation
would require
P
P J(P, Z, Y, G, R) ¼
P
i J(P, Zi ; Yi ; G, RÞ; Z ¼
i Zi ; and Y ¼
i Yi where the sum is
across firms. The linear aggregation is over private quasi-fixed stocks
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5 Results

Table 1 ITSUR estimates—Ball’s data set (average 1949–1994)

With three private inputs, estimation of the system (12c)–
(13b) implies joint estimation of three equations: two
dynamic demands (for labor and capital) and the demand for
the variable input. Additionally, the theoretical model
implies that public inputs are simultaneously determined by
P, Z and Y. Therefore, instrumental variables for the public
inputs must be used. Accordingly, predicted values of G and
R were then adopted for estimation of (12c)–(13b) by iterative nonlinear seemingly unrelated regressions (nonlinear
ITSUR)22 first and then by a Bayesian procedure. These
procedures are used in both data sets, Ball’s covering the
1948–1994 period and TST covering the 1926–1990 period.
As a reminder, the three hypotheses to be tested are:

I—Shadow prices

I.

The shadow price of public inputs is positive,
meaning that public inputs reduce cost of production;
II. Public inputs increase the steady state stock of private
capital K; and
III. There must be increasing returns to scale over all
factors of production (public and private factors).

P*g

P*r

-7.28E-07

1.03E-03

II—Elasticities of demand for private inputs with respect to public
inputs
Short-run elasticities
EKG_SR

EKR_SR ELG_SR

ELR_SR

EMG_SR

EMR_SR

-0.023278 0.01144 0.102954 -0.11942 -1.362192 3.119018
Long-run elasticities
EKG_LR

EKR_LR ELG_LR

-0.03578

0.0102

ELR_LR

-0.70506 0.80778

EMG_LR

EMR_LR

0.988

-1.05432

III—Adjusted elasticity of cost with respect to output
ecy

ecg

egy

ecr

ery

eA
cy

3.79746

1.6298

-4.95216

-1.7752

-6.32002

5.22016

Table 2 ITSUR estimates—TST data set (average 1926–1990)
I—Shadow prices

5.1 ITSUR estimates
Table 1 presents the results (average for the whole sample
period) from the ITSUR estimation using Ball’s data set.
The table is divided in three sections, one for each
hypothesis to be tested. Estimated shadow prices of public
infrastructure and public R&D by decade are presented in
section I of the table. A positive shadow price implies that
the corresponding public input reduces agricultural costs of
production. While positive shadow prices of public
research were obtained for the whole sample period, shadow prices of infrastructure were all negative. Section II
shows long-run impacts of the public inputs on the private
inputs. While R&D increases the stock of private capital,
infrastructure decreases it. In section III we see that the
third hypothesis is not confirmed either as our estimates
indicate decreasing returns to scale in all inputs.
Footnote 21 continued
and output because they are different across firms. For public inputs,
however, this is not required because they are non-rival by definition:
the same input (as long as they are not local public goods) can be used
by many producers at the same time. Hence, for the quadratic value
function presented above, consistent aggregation across firms requires
linearity in Z and Y, i.e., JZZ = BZZ = 0, JZY = BZY = 0, and JYY
= byy = 0, where BZY is a partition matrix of BZQ = [BZG BZR BZY],
and byy is one element of BQQ. For the estimation presented below
aggregation conditions were not imposed. When those conditions are
imposed, there is no qualitative change in the results.
22
Instruments include total U.S. population, number of non-farm
workers, interest rate of federal bonds, and total non-agricultural
exports.
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P*g

P*r

-3.15E-06

5.94E-03

II—Elasticities of demand for private inputs with respect to public
inputs
Short-run elasticities
EKG_SR

EKR_SR

ELG_SR

ELR_SR

EMG_SR

EMR_SR

0.0453

-0.0809

0.0188

-0.0377

38.5343

-24.2119

Long-run elasticities
EKG_LR

EKR_LR

ELG_LR

ELR_LR

EMG_LR

EMR_LR

0.0669

-0.12

0.8779

-1.7622

1.2033

-0.8793

III—Adjusted elasticity of cost with respect to output
ecy

ecg

egy

ecr

ery

eA
cy

0.3642

0.3009

0.3323

-0.3767

-0.3771

0.6062

Table 2 presents the results from the ITSUR estimation
using the TST data set.23 Positive shadow prices of public
research were obtained at the sample mean. Looking at each
observation (not reported here), all R&D shadows were
positive but for the 1951–1960 period; in contrast, shadow
prices of infrastructure were all negative. Estimates of longrun impacts of R&D and infrastructure on private capital are
seen on section II. The elasticity of demand of private capital
with respect to R&D indicates that in steady state, an additional unit of R&D results in a decrease in demand of private
capital while the opposite is true for infrastructure. Section
23

To make the results comparable to those from Ball’s data set, implicit
price indexes were constructed using Ball’s 1967 expenditures. Quantity
indexes were normalized by setting the 1967 value equal to one.
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Table 3 Endogenous growth hypotheses
Ball
Ball’s vs. TST ITSUR
Positive shadows for public
inputs

No,
No,
infrastructure
infrastructure

Positive impact on private capital No,
No, research
infrastructure
Increasing returns to scale
No
Yes
Ball’s vs. TST Bayesian
Positive shadows for public
inputs

Yes

Yes

Positive impact on private capital No, research

Yes

Increasing returns to scale

Yes (?)

No

Ball

TST

III shows the estimated returns to scale for this data set. It
indicates increasing returns to scale (which holds for the
whole period) giving support to the third hypotheses of our
model. Table 3 summarizes these results.
The necessary conditions presented in Appendix 1 and
other regularity conditions of the economic theory can be
checked using the parameter estimates, some are checked
globally and others need to be checked locally at each data
point. A summary of these checks is found in Table 4.
These maximum likelihood estimates violate some of the
theoretical conditions.
5.2 Bayesian estimates
In order to obtain reliable estimates consistent with the
economic theory of the firm, new estimations imposing a
set of required conditions were performed. Some restrictions imply the local imposition of inequality constraints,
that is, the restrictions must be imposed at each data
point.24 One way of doing this is using Bayesian estimation
to introduce the desired conditions as prior beliefs.
Bayesian estimation entails calculation of the joint
posterior distribution of the parameters. Analytical calculation of that distribution is, however, not possible, and
sampling algorithms are generally used to simulate that
joint posterior distribution. Different algorithms have been
developed. This study follows the Metro-Hastings (MH)
algorithm, a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation method that has already been used by Griffiths et al.
(1999), O’Donnell et al. (1999) and O’Donnell (2002) in
previous empirical economic studies.
As other sampling algorithms, the MH simulation method
consists of generating draws of the parameters of interest
from their conditional distribution. Because some restrictions need to be imposed in this case, the algorithm contains
an accept–reject step in which new draws are included in the
24
Diewert and Wales (1987) show that, to impose those conditions
globally, non-flexible functional forms must be adopted.

Ball’s vs. TST ITSUR violations
Monotonicity
No, G, 46/46 obs.
Concavity
Stability
Euler

Yes
Yes
No, K, 4/46 obs.

Adjustment Cost

No, K, 36/46 obs.

Positive Marginal Cost
No,1/46 obs.
Ball’s vs. TST Bayesian violationsa
Monotonicity
No, J, 7/46 obs.
Mon. in public inputs
Imposed
Concavity
Imposed
Stability
Imposed
Euler
No, K 5/46 obs.,
L 17/46 obs.
Adjustment cost
No, K 34/46 obs.,
L 43/46 obs.
Positive marginal cost
Imposed

TST

No, R 10/65 obs.,
G 65/65 obs.
No
No, one eigenvalue
No, K 45/65,
L 47/65 obs.
No, K 41/65,
L 25/65 obs.
No, 25/65 obs.
Yes
Imposed
Imposed
Yes
Yes
No, K 20/65 obs.,
L 55/65 obs.
Yes

a

All conditions in all data points: parameter space empty. All conditions
in 80% of data points: parameter space empty. Euler equations and
adjustment costs conditions dropped

sample if those conditions are satisfied. In this way, the
estimation is constrained to the parameter space that is
consistent with economic theory. Additionally, iterations
followed the process in which each random draw was conditioned on the last draw. After a certain number of iterations,
that process converges to a random sample from the joint
posterior distribution. The MH parameter estimates are then
the mean of that random sample.25
The Bayesian estimates with Ball’s data set are presented in Table 5. The shadow prices of public
infrastructure and research are positive. Moreover, they are
positive for all decades and most of them are significantly
different from zero. This is interpreted as a positive contribution of public inputs to growth of the U.S. agricultural
sector, supporting the first hypothesis.
Sections II and III show the short- and long-run elasticities of demand and the elasticities of cost with respect to
output. Estimates of the long-run elasticities of demand
indicate that, while infrastructure has had positive impacts
on private capital accumulation, public research has
substituted for private capital. Finally, elasticities of cost
with respect to output, even after adjusting for the presence
of public inputs, are larger than one, meaning that the U.S.
agricultural sector has exhibited decreasing returns to scale,
contrary to the postulated endogenous growth condition.

25

A detailed explanation of this Bayesian estimation method is
presented in Griffiths et al. (1999) and O’Donnell et al. (1999).
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Table 5 Bayesian estimates—Ball’s data set (average 1949–1994)
I—Shadow prices
P*g

P*r

3.38E-06

5.78E-03

II—Elasticities of demand for private inputs with respect to public inputs
Short-run elasticities
EKG_SR

EKR_SR

ELG_SR

ELR_SR

EMG_SR

EMR_SR

0.0063514 -0.0507466 -0.0015818 0.0029572 0.5396946 0.8515014
Long-run elasticities
EKG_LR

EKR_LR

0.010121 -0.0816

ELG_LR

ELR_LR

EMG_LR

EMR_LR

0.0061932

-0.014164 0.6562408 0.8336226

III—Adjusted elasticity of cost with respect to output
ecy

ecg

egy

ecr

ery

eA
cy

2.3059694 0.0870676 3.9082624 -0.0251394 1.2065488 1.9854218

Table 6 Bayesian estimates—TST data set (average 1926–1990)
I—Shadow prices
P*g

P*r

3.70E-07

2.42E-04

II—Elasticities of demand for private inputs with respect to public inputs
Short-run elasticities
EKG_SR

EKR_SR

ELG_SR

ELR_SR

EMG_SR

EMR_SR

-0.004123 -0.005129 -0.000284 -0.000728 -0.157398 -0.07149
Long-run elasticities
EKG_LR

EKR_LR

ELG_LR

ELR_LR

EMG_LR

0.008171

0.010137

0.002774

0.007377

-0.143231 -0.048425

EMR_LR

III—Adjusted elasticity of cost with respect to output
ecy

ecg

egy

ecr

ery

eA
cy

0.4678277 -0.067493 2.8619869 -0.03135 30.614636 -0.685106

Bayesian estimates of the parameters using the TST data
set can be seen in Table 6. The shadow prices of public
infrastructure and research are positive at the sample mean.
The shadows for public infrastructure are also significantly
positive for all decades. Those for public R&D are significantly positive from 1941 to 1950, and from 1961 to 1980.
These estimates support the first hypothesis of the theory.
An interesting calculation here is possible. These results
indicate that, on average, an additional dollar spent on
public R&D stocks will reduce costs by 6.5 dollars. If one
assumes a 30-year impact of such an investment it means
that one million dollars of R&D expenses have induced cost
savings with a present value of 2.9 millions dollars, at a 5%
discount rate. This implies a rate of returns to public R&D
investments of 190%. The same calculation for investments
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in public infrastructure give a far less impressive estimate of
the rate of returns of approximately 1%.
Sections II and III show the short- and long-run elasticities of demand and the elasticities of cost with respect to
output. Estimates of the short-run elasticities of demand
indicate that, in general, public inputs do not affect private
inputs. Long-run estimates, however, show that both public
infrastructure and public R&D have had positive impacts
on private capital accumulation, which is consistent with
our hypothesis. Although these elasticities are significantly
positive, they are very small. When looking by decade, the
larger estimated impact is in the 1981–1990 period: for
every 10% increase in the stock of public infrastructure or
public R&D, private capital increases about 0.35%.
Finally, elasticities of cost with respect to output (first
column of Table 6—III) show that the U.S. agricultural sector
has exhibited increasing returns to scale in private inputs
(except for the 1981–1990 period). That is, these elasticities
are less than one even before adjusting for public inputs. This
table also shows that additional units of infrastructure and
R&D decrease cost (second and fourth columns of Table 6).
The cross elasticities between public inputs and output
although not significantly different from zero, are of a very
large magnitude. When they are used to calculate the augmented scale elasticity the results are inconsistent with
economic theory as they indicate that additional output results
in lower private costs. Table 3 summarizes these results.
The MH estimation using Ball’s data set was first done
imposing the required conditions on all data points. In this
case, no draw satisfying all the conditions could be obtained,
i.e. the parameter space that satisfies the restrictions was
empty. The conditions were then relaxed and, due to potential
measurement errors, they were required to be satisfied only at
80% of the observations (Atkinson and Dorfman 2001). Since
this relaxation was not enough to get a nonempty set, the
conditions implied by the Euler equations and adjustment
costs were not imposed.26 Table 5 shows then the MH
parameter estimates without imposing these two conditions.
As done with Ball’s data set, Bayesian estimates of the
parameters using the TST data set were first obtained with
imposition of all required conditions on all data points. In
this case, no draw satisfying all the conditions could be
obtained, i.e. the parameter space that satisfies the restrictions was again empty. The MH estimation was then
relaxed by imposing only concavity of the value function
and monotonicity in public inputs. Table 4 summarizes the
violations by both set of estimates.27
26

This was determined by trial and error examination of the
conditions. It was found that the Euler equation and adjustment cost
conditions were the conditions more difficult to be satisfied.
27
Appendix 5 includes a discussion of other diagnostic tests run on
these data as well as potential extensions of the analysis.
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the value function estimated indicate rejection of monotonicity and curvature for both data sets, consistent with our
results. They question the robustness of the aggregate data
‘‘to allow our models to capture the structure of the decisionmaking environment‘‘ (page 1,002).
Among the concepts estimated by these authors, the
relative speed of adjustment of the inputs to their long run
steady state level is one we can readily compare to our
results. Our results, as well as the results in all four papers
mentioned indicate that capital adjusts faster than labor, as
seen in Table 7.
Returns to scale can also be compared to the estimates in
Luh and Stefanou (1991) and Luh and Stefanou (1993)
having in mind that their estimates include disequilibrium
terms while ours are at the steady state. In the first paper,
these authors report decreasing returns to scale on private
inputs in U.S. agriculture. In the second paper, that
includes potential non-convexities given by ‘learning-by
doing’, they report decreasing returns evolving into
increasing returns by the end of their data period. Maximum likelihood as well as Bayesian estimates from Ball’s
data set indicate decreasing returns to scale in both private
only and private and public inputs. Maximum likelihood as
well as the Bayesian estimates from the TST data estimate
increasing returns from all factors, public and private, as
well as for private factors (see Table 8).

Table 7 Estimated speed of adjustment
K–K*

L–L*

DK

-0.092

-0.164

DL

0.049

-0.195

NLITSUR
Ball’s data set (1948–1994)
TST data set (1925–1990) 1967 = 1

DK

0.095

-0.008

(It is not stable)

DL

-0.239

-0.046

DK

-0.203

0.053

DL

-0.416

-0.129

DK

-0.051

-0.012

DL

-0.019

-0.069

MH estimation
Ball’s data set (1948–1994)
TST data set (1925–1990) 1967 = 1

5.3 Results from other studies
A preliminary look at the results obtained by other
researchers using similar procedures and data for U.S. agriculture indicate that Luh and Stefanou (1991, 1993) as well
as Vasavada and Chambers, and Vasavada and Ball’s estimates also reject the theoretical curvature conditions. It is not
obvious in these papers what they find in terms of the
monotonicity restrictions. Luh and Stefanou (1996) uses two
data sets, one of which is a precursor of Ball’s data set used in
our paper, to test the hypotheses derived from a dynamic dual
model with non-static expectations. Tests of the properties of

Table 8 Summary statistics for both data sets
BALL’s
Period: 1948–1994
Quantity indexes: 1987 = 1
Implicit price indexes
Year

Output

Materials

Labor

Capital + land

Infrast. stock

Qy

Pm

Qm

PL

Mean

0.778

47874

0.893

St. Dev.

0.195

25745

0.152

Max

1.198

91902

1.165

51974

Min

0.502

22413

0.574

3797

R&D stock
(exp. from Alston + Pardey)
R

QL

Qkland

Pkland

G

17462

1.759

1.013

32027

1167226

971

14261

0.700

0.099

28577

1088268

1078

3.304

1.182

95942

3568275

3744

0.937

0.688

3819

126061
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TST
Period: 1925–1990
Quantity indexes: 1967 = 1
Implicit price indexes
Year

Output

Fertilizers

Labor

Capital + land

Infrast. stock

R&D stock

Qy

Pm

Qm

PL

QL

Qk

Pk

G

R

Mean

0.883

26656

0.734

St. Dev.

0.287

10779

0.656

19333

1.805

0.908

18226

651309

19714

1.027

0.183

18204

850450

Max

1.420

52670

432.3

1.961

69571

3.400

1.218

58241

2966789

1574.3

Min

0.430

14428

0.050

1827

0.524

0.605

3627

32194

42.0

467.0
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6 Conclusions
This paper is an attempt to understand the impact of public
R&D and public infrastructure on the performance of the
U.S. agricultural sector during the last part of the twentieth
century. We ask if public policy could have been responsible for the sustained growth of the sector or if it just had a
one time level effect. Given this sustained growth, a traditional neoclassical Solow growth model is not sufficient
for the analysis. We have based our analysis on a well
known endogenous growth model, the ‘AK model’ where
non-convexities are explained by the presence of non-rival
inputs. We tried to keep true to the intrinsic nature of the
growth process by using a dynamic model of behavior.
We have modeled the private decision making process
when some private inputs are quasi-fixed and some inputs
are public. In this context we have identified the conditions
for sustained growth by deriving the impact of the nonrival inputs on the firm’s objective (derivative property), on
the dynamic demand for quasi-fixed factors (their steady
state as well as their adjustment), and on returns to scale
(extended Le Chatelier).
We have modeled the public decision making process in
the provision of public inputs as that of a benevolent social
planner whose objective is to maximize producers’ surplus.
We examined the behavioral properties implied by such
model of public behavior and derived an optimal provision of
public goods consistent with such an objective. We show that
when the government maximizes intertemporal welfare by
minimizing producers’ cost it is possible to recover properties that characterized public behavior from those that
characterize private behavior. We use these results to identify behavioral properties related to the rationality in the
provision of public inputs, one of them being the expectation
that endogenous prices for these inputs be non-negative. This
is the property that, jointly with the derivative property of
private decision makers, allows identification of the sign in
this relationship to be used as a testable hypothesis.
In contrast to other studies (for instance, Nadiri and
Mamuneas 1994; Morrison and Schwartz 1996), this paper
rationalizes the public provision of non-rival inputs.
Although Binswanger et al. (1993) and Huffman et al.
(2002) have considered the public provision of infrastructure, they have done so using a static approach. The closest
analysis, in spirit and method, would be that of Luh and
Stefanou (1993) who introduced learning-by-doing as a
source of growth in U.S. agriculture. The difference with
ours is that while Luh and Stefanou study an economy
internal to the firms as the source of growth we study
public inputs which are external to the firm.
Theoretical analysis has allowed us to identify three
behavioral hypotheses about the U.S. agricultural sector
that are testable. They are: (1) increasing returns to scale
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over all inputs (private and public); (2) positive effect of
additional units of public inputs on the long-run demand
for private capital; and (3) negative impact of public inputs
on cost.
These hypotheses were tested using two data sets for U.S.
agriculture. One, covering the period 1948–1994, was
developed by USDA following the guidelines of the AAEA
taskforce on statistics with the objective of obtaining consistent indexes. The other, covering the period 1926–1990,
was constructed by Thritle et al. A flexible functional form
was adopted for the value function of the firm that included
public inputs. The derived demand for two quasi-fixed
factors, labor and private capital, and one variable factor,
materials, were obtained and fitted using two different
methods. These are a maximum likelihood estimator, the
iterative non-linear seemingly unrelated procedure; and a
Bayesian estimator from Griffith et al. (1999).
Using the parameters estimated the three hypotheses
derived from the theory were tested. We learned that the
maximum likelihood estimates from USDA’s data set did
not support any of the three hypotheses. We also learned
that these estimates did not conform to the regularity or
behavioral conditions of the hypothesized behavior, rendering us unable to test the hypotheses. These results are
consistent with those of other studies (Vasavada and
Chambers, Vasavada and Ball, Luh and Stefanou (1996))
that have estimated dynamic (as well as static) behavior
with aggregate data. The maximum likelihood estimates
from the TST data supported the first hypothesis, that of
increasing returns to scale, but did not support the other
two. These estimates also do not conform to the regularity
and behavioral properties implied by economic theory.
We then used a Bayesian approach to impose some of the
regularity and behavioral conditions on estimation. We
relaxed the constraints that seemed binding, the Euler
equation and the adjustment cost conditions. We learned that
when using the USDA data set, only the third hypothesis was
satisfied, indicating that additional units of R&D as well as
public infrastructure have reduced private cost. It seems that
for this aggregate data set we need to impose all the behavioral and regularity conditions to obtain meaningful
estimates. These results support that of other studies
(O’Donnell et al. 1999) that have used this estimation
approach with a static framework on some version of this
data set. Bayesian estimates using the TSM data set seem
consistent with all three hypotheses for endogenous growth
in U.S. agriculture. That is, we find evidence of positive
effects of public inputs on the steady state level of private
capital, positive endogenous prices for R&D and public
infrastructure and increasing returns to scale. The estimates
that support the third hypothesis, that of positive shadow
prices for public inputs, give an interesting insight. They
indicate that, on average, an additional dollar spent on public
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R&D stocks will reduce costs by 6.5 dollars. This implies a
rate of returns to public R&D investments of 190%. The
same calculation for investments in public infrastructure
gives a far less impressive estimate of the rate of returns of
approximately 1%.
A note of caution seems necessary. There are other theoretical, structural, and econometric modeling issues that we
have not considered. We have not modeled expectations, or
uncertainty in the production process. We have not statistically tested for specification error. We have not checked for
endogeneity of prices or output that might matter at this level
of aggregation. We have not included private R&D nor
extension expenditures. We have not considered human capital formation as an external factor when we believe that it is
probably one of the most important factors affecting growth of
this sector. We have not attempted to follow our model more
strictly by simultaneously estimating the full public decision
process as well as the private decision process.
It is important, though, to separate the theoretical from
the econometric aspects of this paper. This paper has
extended a well known endogenous growth model that
explains sustained growth through provision of public
R&D and infrastructure, non-rival production inputs. The
extension has been to model private and public behavior
within a dynamic context so as to derive three testable
hypotheses from the theory. These are derivations of general application. The theory was used to understand the role
of public inputs on the sustained growth of the U.S. agricultural sector. In order to do so we use aggregates of
outputs and inputs for the sector. We find some evidence of
support of these hypotheses but we encounter a series of
problems as estimates are not always consistent with the
postulates of economic theory. In this sense this study
supports the conclusions of many others that have used
aggregate data to understand the decision making process.
We join Luh and Stefanou (1996) in concluding that
‘‘Nevertheless, it is disturbing that two data series purporting to measure the production decisions by agents
within the same sector present contradictory evidence...’’
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(A.1)
(A.2)

(A.3)
(A.4)

(A.5)

(A.6)

Conditions (B)
It is assumed that the value function J(Z, y, p; G) satisfies
the following properties:
(B.1)
(B.2)

This Appendix presents conditions (A) and (B) that guarantee duality between cost and value functions of the firms.
Conditions (A)
It is assumed that C(y, Z, I; G) satisfies the following set of
regularity conditions:

J(Z, y, p; G) C 0.
(i) ðru þ dÞJz ðZ, y, p; GÞ  p  Jzz ðZ, y, p; GÞZ_ 
ðZ, y, p; GÞ\0; where u is an identity matrix.
This expression is dual to Cz \ 0:
Jz(Z, y, p; G) \ 0 when I ðZ, y, p; GÞ 
Z_  ðZ, y, p; GÞ þ dZ [ 0 and vice versa. This
condition is dual to CI [ 0 when I [ 0 and
vice versa.
(iii) qJy ðZ, y, p; GÞ  J0yz ðZ, y, p; GÞZ_  ðZ, y, p;
GÞ [ 0; where Z_  ðZ, y, p; GÞ ¼ J1
pz ðZ, y,
p; GÞ½qJp ðZ, y, p; GÞ  Z: This condition is
dual to Cy [ 0.

(ii)

(B.3)

The following expression is concave in p:
qJ(Z, y, p; G)  p0 Z
 J0z ðZ, y, p; GÞZ_  ðZ, y, p; GÞ

We thank Dick Perrin for comments on this
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C(y, Z, I; G) C 0.
C(y, Z, I; G) is increasing in y and decreasing in Z.
Additionally, CI [ 0 when I [ 0 and vice versa,
which follows from the assumption of adjustment
costs.
C(y, Z, I; G) is convex in I.
For each (Z0, y, p; G) a unique solution exists for
(1). This means that there are well-defined factor
demand functions associated with (1).
For each (Z0, y, p; G), problem (1) has a unique
steady state (SS) stock Zðy, p; GÞ that is globally
stable. This condition establishes the uniqueness
and stability of the steady state.
For any (Z0, y, p; G), there exists ^p such that ^I is the
optimal gross investment vector at t = 0 in (1)
given (Z0, y, p; G).

(B.4)
(B.5)

Under some specific functional forms (like the
normalized quadratic presented above), Jz(Z, y, p;
G) is linear in p and the curvature requirement
reduces to concavity of J(Z, y, p; G) in p. This
condition is dual to (A.3).
The demand for the variable input, X*(Z, y, p; G),
is positive.
The stock Z that solves Z_  ðZ, y, p; GÞ ¼ J1
pz
ðZ, y, p; GÞ½qJp ðZ, y, p; GÞ  Z; with Z(0) [ 0,
has a unique globally stable steady state
Zðy, p; GÞ:
Then, under conditions (A) and (B), duality
between C(y, Z, I; G.) and J(Z, y, p; G) can be
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established as in Eqs. 2 and 3. The following
derivative properties then hold:

Conditions (C)

Derivative properties

It is assumed that J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) satisfies the
following conditions:

1.

(C.1)

J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) C 0

(C.2)

(i)

J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) is increasing in Ig.
Given that J(y, Z, p; G) is independent of Ig,
AC(Ig) must be increasing in Ig.
(ii) J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) is decreasing in G.
Given that AC(Ig) is independent of G, J(y, Z,
p; G) must be decreasing in G.

(C.3)

J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) is convex in Ig. Then,
AC(Ig) must be convex in Ig.
For each (Z, p, y, r, G0), there exists a unique
solution for (8). This means that there are welldefined supplies of public inputs.
For each (Z, p, y, r, G0), (8) has a unique steady
state stock GðZ, p, y, rÞ that is globally stable.
For any (Z, p, y, r, G0), there exists ^r such that ^Ig is
the optimal public gross investment vector at t = 0
in (8), given (Z, p, y, r, G0).

With respect to I:
CI(y, Z, I; G) = -Jz(Z, y, p; G). From (A.2) or
(B.2.ii), this expression must be positive when I [ 0
and vice versa. Testing for Jz(Z, y, p; G) = 0 is
equivalent to testing for adjustment costs in inputs Z.
With respect to Z:

2.

Cz ðy, Z, I; GÞ ¼ðqu þ dÞJz ðZ, y, p; GÞ  p
 Jzz ðZ, y, p; GÞZ_  ðZ, y, p; GÞ\0
from (A.2).
This expression gives the shadow price of quasifixed inputs.
3. With respect to y:
Cy ðy, Z, I; GÞ ¼qJy ðZ, y, p; GÞ
 J0zy ðZ, y, p; GÞZ_  ðZ, y, p; GÞ[ 0
from (A.2).
This expression represents the output supply of
the firms.
4. With respect to p:
0 ¼ qJp ðZ, y, p; GÞ  Z
 Jzp ðZ, y, p; GÞZ_  ðZ, y, p; GÞ
Then, Z_  ðZ, y, p; GÞ ¼ J1
pz ðZ, y, p; GÞ½qJp ðZ,
y; p; GÞ  Z; which is the dynamic demand for
Z.
5. With respect to G:

(C.4)

(C.5)
(C.6)

Conditions (D)
It is assumed that Jg(y, Z, p; r, G) satisfies the following
conditions:
(D.1)

Jg(y, Z, p; r, G) C 0

(D.2)

JgG ðy, Z, p; r, GÞ\0: This condition is dual to
(C.2)(i) and means that there are adjustment
costs in the provision of public inputs.
(ii) ðhu þ dg ÞJgG ðy, Z, p; r, GÞ  JgGG ðy, Z, p; r,
GÞG_  \0: This expression is dual to (C.2)
(ii): JG(y, Z, p; r, G) \ 0 (positive shadow
prices of public inputs). Given JgG ðy, Z,
p; r, GÞ\0; it is sufficient for (D.2)(ii) to
hold that JgGG ðy, Z, p; r, GÞ\0 (that is,
increases of the public good decrease the
shadow price of it).

CG ðy, Z, I; GÞ ¼ qJG ðZ, y, p; GÞ
 JZG ðZ, y, p; GÞZ_  ðZ, y, p; GÞ
This expression represents the shadow price of G when
the firms are out of the SS. At the SS, the shadow price
is
CG ðy, Z, I; GÞ ¼ qJG ðZ, y, p; GÞ
If this expression is negative, the shadow price of G is
positive, meaning that public inputs reduce cost of
production.

(D.3)
(D.4)
(D.5)

Appendix 2
This Appendix presents conditions (C) to (D) that guarantee duality between the value function of the firms and
the value function of the government.
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(i)

_
ðZ, y, p, r, GÞ  r0 G  Jg0
G ðZ, y, p, r, GÞG must
be concave in r. This is dual to condition (C.3).
Ig ðy, Z, p; r, GÞ  G_  ðy, Z, p; r, GÞ þ dg G is positive.
The stocks G that solve G_  ðy, Z, p; r, GÞ ¼
g
Jg1
with
Gr ðy, Z, p; r, GÞ½h Jr ðy, Z, p; r, GÞ  G;
G(0) [ 0, has a unique globally stable steady state
GðZ, p, y; rÞ:
hJ

g

Then, under conditions (C) and (D), duality between
Jg(y, Z, p; r, G) and J(y, Z, p; r, G) + AC(Ig) can be

J Prod Anal

established as in Eqs. 9 and 10. The derivative
properties presented below then hold.

Jz ðZ, y, p; GÞ ¼ h Jgz ðp, Z, y; r, GÞ
 JgGz ðp, Z, y; r, GÞG_  \0

Derivative properties
1.

With respect to Ig:
0 ¼ ACIg þ JgG ðp, Z, y; r, GÞ

5.

or

g
h Jy ðp,

JgG ðp, Z, y; r, GÞ ¼ ACIg [ 0;
2.

This is positive given ACIg [ 0:
With respect to G:
g
h JG ðp,

Jy ðZ,y,p;GÞ ¼ h Jgy ðp, Z, y; r, GÞ
_
 Jg0
Gy ðp, Z, y; r, GÞG [ 0
where the sign is given by condition B.2(iii):
the value function of the firm is increasing in
y. Finally, at the SS level of G (or with no
adjustment cost of G),

or
JG ðZ, y, p; GÞ ¼ ðhu þ dg ÞJgG ðp, Z, y; r, GÞ
 r  JgGG ðp, Z, y; r, GÞG_ 

JgG ðp, Z, y; r, GÞ ¼ ðhu þ dg Þ1
ðJG ðZ,y,p;GÞ  rÞ

3.

which could be interpreted as a ‘social’
shadow price: the net social benefit (the
firms’ shadow price of G minus the government’s cost of providing G) adjusted by
the ‘social’ discount rate plus the depreciation rate of public inputs.
With respect to r:
g
h Jr ðp,

Z, y; r, GÞ ¼ G þ JgGr ðp, Z, y; r, GÞG_ 

or
g
G_  ¼ Jg1
Gr ðp, Z, y; r, GÞ½h Jr ðp, Z, y; r, GÞ  G

4.

which gives the optimal path of G.
With respect to Z:
g
h Jz ðp,

or

Z, y; r, GÞ ¼ Jz ðZ, y, p; GÞ
þ JgGz ðp, Z, y; r, GÞG_ 

Z, y; r, GÞ ¼ Jy ðZ,y,p;GÞ
_
þ Jg0
Gy ðp, Z, y; r, GÞG

or

Z, y; r, GÞ ¼ JG ðZ, y, p; GÞ þ r
þ JgGG ðp, Z, y; r, GÞG_ 
 dg JgG ðp, Z, y; r, GÞ

This expression is the firms’ willingness to
pay for G (shadow price) when the firms are
at the steady state. If the expression is
negative (condition (D.2)(ii)), then public
inputs reduce cost of production. When the
government is also at the SS, that expression
can be rewritten as

where the sign is given by condition B.2(ii):
the value function of the firm is decreasing in
Z.
With respect to y:

Jy ðZ, y, p; GÞ ¼ h Jgy ðp, Z, y; r, GÞ [ 0
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